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ABSTRACT 
When witnesses are exposed to highly stressful and emotional events, the result is often 
increased arousal and a change in the pattern of attention.  Both of these factors are likely to 
impact witnesses’ memory for the event.  In addition, witnesses are often exposed to post-
event information from a variety of sources (e.g., investigators, other witnesses, media 
reports).  The goal of the present study was to explore, in the context of the eyewitness 
suggestibility paradigm, the impact of emotional arousal and attentional focus on event 
memory and the incidence of eyewitness suggestibility.  A secondary goal of this study was to 
explore the possible relationship between emotional arousal and individual differences in 
people’s experience of, and reaction to, this arousal (Affect Intensity).  The results revealed 
that emotional manipulation had an impact on subjects’ memory for the event; emotion Ss 
recognized more event only items but only in the arousal phase of the slide sequence.  The 
result also indicated that emotion Ss were more likely to misattribute post-event information 
to the event than were the neutral event subjects.  Finally, the results showed that the 
magnitude of the suggestibility effect was significantly larger for emotional event subjects.  
The present study provides some empirical support that emotional arousal can have both 
positive and negative consequences on memory for the event.  There was no support for the 
role of attentional focus and personality dimension of affect intensity on eyewitness 
performance. 
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INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Imagine yourself in the following situation: it is in the late afternoon when you leave 
your workplace, situated in a downtown area, heading for the parking-garage across the street.  
As you reach the elevator to go to the floor where you parked your car, a person approaches 
you with a handgun drawn and pointed at you.  Stunned and panicked, you hear the elevator 
door opening; you jump in the elevator just before the door closes.  Terrified and shaken you 
reach for your cell phone and call 911 for help and at the same time you hit the stop button.  
The elevator is blocked between floors; later you hear a man’s voice identifying himself as a 
police officer.  Later, at the police station, you recall the event. 
This above scenario is a hypothetical example of a highly arousing eyewitness event, an 
event during which the witness experiences very strong emotional and physiological reactions 
as the result of a direct threat.  According to a wide range of research done to understand how 
emotions (i.e., arousal resulting from exposure to either a positive or negative event) affect 
memory, we can expect that the witness in the above scenario to experience either an 
enhanced or diminished memory for the witnessed event.  On one hand, there are studies that 
support the view that memory retention is better in response to events that are perceived by 
individuals as threatening, stressful or personally relevant and the accounts of the events are 
fairly well remembered, highly accurate and rich in perceptual detail (e.g., Cahill & 
McGaugh, 1995; Christianson, 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987).  On the other hand, there 
are studies that support the opposite view; that memory retention will be impaired or partially 
diminished, at least for some types of information (e.g., Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; 
Heuer & Reisberg, 1990, Reisberg, & Heuer, 2004; Pickel, French, and Betts, 2003).  For 
example, research has found that participants who see a weapon during a simulated crime are 
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less likely to remember peripheral details of the event (the weapon focus effect; for a review, 
see Steblay, 1992).  The goal of the following study is to better understand the conditions 
under which emotion helps or hinders memory for eyewitness events.  In order to do this, the 
study will examine the effects of emotional arousal and attentional focus. 
In the remainder of the introduction, I first briefly review relevant research on emotion 
and event memory.  Next, I introduce the source monitoring framework and the issue of 
emotional focus, followed by a discussion of eyewitness suggestibility.  Finally, I will discuss 
potential individual differences in the way that people experience affect (affect intensity). 
Memory and Arousal 
A number of studies have tried to systematically examine the effect of arousal on 
various aspects of event memory.  Among the first to do so was Heuer & Reisberg (1990).  
Subjects in this study watched a sequence of slides accompanied by a tape narration.  In the 
neutral version, subjects heard and saw a story about a boy and his mother going to visit his 
father at work; in this version the father was a chief mechanic at a garage.  The mother leaves 
the garage, stopping to call her boss to say that she will be late for work.  In the arousal 
version, the mother and son visit the father at work; in this version the father is chief surgeon 
at a local hospital.  In the middle slides subjects saw a surgery and the patient’s badly 
damaged legs.  The mother leaves the hospital, stopping to call her boss to say that she would 
be late for work.  To assess subjects’ level of arousal, heart rate was monitored and recorded.  
Subjects in both neutral and emotional conditions were instructed “to attend the story while 
your heart is monitored.”  The authors also included a memorizing and a problem-solving 
condition.  Subjects in those two conditions watched only the neutral version of the story.  
Subjects in memorizing condition were told to “memorize both the central story line….as well 
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the circumstantial details.”  Those in the problem-solving condition were told that their task 
was to “discern what event was mimicked.”  All subjects returned to the lab two weeks later 
for surprise recall and recognition tests, and subjects’ memory was assessed for two kinds of 
information—central and peripheral.  Their definition for central information was “any fact or 
element pertaining to the basic story that could not be changed or excluded without changing 
the basic story line.”  For example the fact that the father was a surgeon and not a pediatrician 
was a central type of information; the color of the mother’s sweater was considered peripheral 
information.  Heuer & Reisberg (1990) found that emotion had multiple effects on memory.  
First, they reported that overall arousal promoted memory for central information; subjects in 
the arousal condition recalled significantly more central information.  These subjects also 
outperformed all other groups in the recognition task, with better memory for the middle 
phase of the procedure.  Second, the emotional arousal enhanced the subjects’ range of 
attention in that arousal subjects had more detailed memory for both the emotional slides and 
for the slides that followed the emotional ones.  Third, arousal affected the pattern of intrusion 
errors.  Subjects in the neutral condition were more likely to err regarding the plot (i.e., 
subjects described or identified events that had not appeared at all), while subjects in the 
arousal condition erred about the character of the protagonists (i.e., subjects tended to 
confabulate, exaggerate or falsify the characters’ feelings and reactions). 
In a follow-up study, Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg (1992) examined in a more systematic 
way the relationship between arousal, retention interval, and the type of to-be-remembered 
material.  The materials employed in this study were identical with Heuer & Reisberg (1990) 
study.  One group of subjects viewed a series of slides depicting an emotionally arousing 
story while the other viewed a series of slides depicting a neutral story.  Each of the two slide  
 3
series was subdivided in three phases according to the plot of the story: first phase—slides 
before the arousal manipulation was introduced, second phase—slides during the arousal 
manipulation, and third phase—slides following the arousal manipulation.  Within each 
group, subjects were tested immediately (Exp.1 and 2), 1 week (Exp.1 and 2) or 2 weeks 
(Exp.1) later.  At test, subjects’ memory was assessed with a recognition test containing 
multiple-choice questions that focused on four different types of information about the event 
(e.g., gist, basic-level visual information, central details, and background details).  As in their 
previous study, emotional arousal had two effects on memory.  First, emotion improved 
overall memory for both central and peripheral details.  Second, emotion aided memory for 
central aspects of the event and impaired memory for more peripheral aspects of the event in 
phase 2, but not in the other phases. 
Cahill & McGaugh (1995) followed up on the findings of Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg 
(1992) by examining whether the results could be explained by the different visual materials 
that were seen by subjects in the arousal and neutral conditions.  In Exp.1, using identical 
materials and procedures, Cahill & McGaugh replicated findings of Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg 
(1992).  In Exp.2 they changed the slide sequence such that subjects saw identical slides in 
both neutral and arousal conditions.  Arousal was induced by a narration that accompanied the 
slides in the phase 2 of the arousal version (Phase 1 and 3 were highly similar).  The free 
recall and recognition tests were administered two weeks later to all subjects.  In both 
experiments, subjects in the arousal condition showed a significant increase in emotional 
reactions relative to those in the neutral condition.  Arousal condition subjects also recalled 
more elements of the story than the neutral condition subjects; the enhanced memory for the 
slides was the result of better recall in phase 2.  Although the authors found no overall 
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differences in recognition performance between subjects in the neutral and arousal conditions, 
a phase-by-phase analysis of the recognition test revealed enhanced memory in the emotional 
group subjects for phase 2 (which contained the emotional manipulation).  However, unlike 
Burke, et al. (1992), Cahill & McGaugh found better memory in the arousal condition for 
both central and peripheral details in phase 2. 
Research on emotion and memory has found that emotional arousal can sometimes 
increase retention.  This finding has been largely attributed to biochemical changes in the 
brain (e.g., increased release of adrenaline; Cahill, Prins, Cahill, & McGaugh, 1994) and to 
greater activation of the amygdala, which increases memory formation through connections to 
the hippocampus (e.g., McGaugh, Ferry, Vazdarjanova, & Roozendaal, 2000).  Other 
researchers (Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; Heuer & Reisberg, 
1990; Laney, Campbell, Heuer, & Reisberg, 2004) have argued that arousal, per se, is not 
solely responsible for the obtained results. 
Instead, it is argued that emotional arousal causes attentional narrowing (i.e., arousal 
causes a decrease in the range of cues to which an individual can attend).  This narrowing of 
attention leads directly to the exclusion of peripheral cues, resulting in a poorer memory for 
those peripheral aspects of an emotional event.  This attentional narrowing is also responsible 
for the beneficial effects of emotion on memory for the central elements of the event.  
Specifically, arousal is thought to act as an attention magnet—a very specific allocation of 
mental resources on those central aspects that contain the arousing information.  This 
particular pattern of findings is found as well in research on the weapon focus effect. 
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Weapon Focus Effect 
A second area of research to explore the issue of emotion and memory concerns the 
weapon focus effect (for a review, see Steblay, 1992).  The weapon focus effect is a 
phenomenon in which the presence of a weapon (e.g., a gun, a knife, a sword, etc.) in the 
possession of a perpetrator decreases a witness’s ability to remember what the perpetrator 
looked like and/or other details of the crime, as measured by identification performance or 
recall of physical features (e.g., Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, and Memon, 2001; Pickel, French, and 
Betts, 2003; Shaw and Stolnick, 1999; Wells and Olson, 2003). 
In a classic demonstration of the effect, Loftus et al. (1987) showed Ss a series of slides 
depicting an event in a fast-food restaurant.  In the experimental version of the slide sequence, 
half of the Ss saw a male perpetrator confronting the cashier with a gun.  In the control 
condition, the other half of the subjects saw the same person holding a check.  Using an eye-
tracking device, the eye movements of subjects were recorded while they watched the slide 
sequence.  The results showed that subjects focused more often, and for longer periods of 
time, on the gun in comparison to the check.  In addition, performance of the subjects in the 
weapon was poorer than the control condition on a lineup identification task.  Loftus et al. 
(1987) argued that their results supported the weapon salience hypothesis, according to which 
witnesses are attending only to the weapon while ignoring all the other details of the 
witnessed event (e.g., Pickel, 1998).  An alternative view is that the weapon focus effect is 
due to heightened arousal.  According to this view, the weapon indicates a threat, which 
induces emotional arousal among the witnesses, focusing their attention toward the source of 
the threat (weapon) and away from the perpetrator.  The arousal hypothesis is a variation of 
Easterbrook’s cue-utilization theory.  The presence of a weapon signals to the witness the  
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existence of a threat which causes both an increased level of emotional arousal and a 
decreased level of attentional capacity, and as a result, the attention of the witness is focused 
on central (the weapon) rather than peripheral (physical features of the perpetrator) aspects of 
the scene.  This hypothesis is supported by empirical data from subsequent research.  For 
example, Kramer et al., (1990) experiment presented participants with a series of slides 
showing the perpetrator with the weapon totally exposed and participants in the control 
version saw the weapon hidden or partially exposed.  It was found that participants in the 
experimental condition remembered fewer details about the person holding the gun than 
participants in the control condition.  In addition, they reported that the experimental 
condition participants also reported higher levels of arousal.  Kramer suggested that 
participants at high levels of fear (stress) or emotions probably attend to only a few details 
because fewer attentional resources are available as the result of the attentional narrowing. 
Emotional Focus and Source Monitoring 
The Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) of Marcia Johnson (Johnson, Nolde, & De 
Leonardis, 1996; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 
1988) characterizes the process involved in determining the origin of memories, knowledge, 
or beliefs.  At its core, SMF proposes that people determine the source of an item through a 
judgment process (i.e., rather than simply retrieving a source “tag” from memory).  At the 
time of encoding, various features of events (e.g., visual, semantic, contextual, and affective 
detail) become part of the memory trace.  According to this view, different sources of 
information have, on average, different phenomenal characteristics associated with them.  For 
instance, memories of perceived events are more likely to include records of perceptual detail 
(color, shape, sound) and contextual detail (time, place), than memories of imagined events  
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that are more likely to include records of cognitive processes such as organization, elaboration 
and identification (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988).  At retrieval, people judge the 
activated qualities of a given memory against their knowledge of event characteristics.  Thus, 
one way that source attribution errors can occur is when an activated memory trace has 
characteristics that are typical of an alternate source (e.g., when memories of imagined items 
contain much visual or contextual detail). 
Although research clearly demonstrates that the level of emotionality of an event can 
affect memory (e.g., Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992), another issue concerns the 
consequences of focusing on one’s experienced emotions during the event.  According to 
SMF, focusing on some aspects of an event (e.g., emotion) at encoding may sometimes lead 
to a paucity of detail about other aspects (visual or contextual detail) that would be needed to 
make an accurate attribution of the memory (e.g., Johnson, Nolde, & DeLeonardis, 1996). 
Several studies have examined this issue in the context of SMF.  For example, Johnson, 
Nolde, & De Leonardis (1996) examined the potential consequences of emotional focus on 
memory for content and memory for source.  Specifically, they hypothesized that the relation 
between emotion and memory is dependent on the specific nature of the perceptual and 
reflective processing induced by emotion.  Subjects heard statements of varying affective 
valence (Exp. 1), or watched a videotape in which two people made various affective 
statements (Exp. 2 and 3).  In Exp.1 and 2, subjects in the self-focus condition were told to 
focus on how they felt about the statements and in the other-focus condition they were told to 
focus on how the speakers felt.  A third self/speaker-focus condition (subjects’ task was to 
think about how they felt about the speaker) was added in the Exp. 3.  The acquisition phase 
was followed by a source-memory test for which subjects were asked to identify for each  
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statement whether speaker A or B had made the statement, or whether the statement was new.  
The authors reported that self-focus resulted in equal or better recognition for the content of 
the statements than did other-focus, but poorer identification of the source of the statements 
(Exp.1-3).  In addition, the deficit of self-focus relative to other-focus was eliminated when 
participants focused on how they felt about the speakers rather than on how they felt about 
what was being said (Exp. 3).  These findings indicate that whether emotional focus is likely 
to produce confusion among external source of memories depends on whether it reduces the 
processing that binds content with the kinds of perceptual, contextual, and semantic features 
of external events that are important cues for source.  Thus, focusing on how one feels about 
some topic sometimes results in more impoverished encoding of perceptual and contextual 
information that are necessary for accurate source monitoring in some situations. 
Mather & Johnson (1998) explored whether thinking about feelings and reactions to a 
story would increase the likelihood of integrative memory distortion.  Subjects were told 
either to focus on the details of the story (factual focus condition) or to focus on their feelings 
and reactions to the story (emotional focus condition).  Subjects heard one of two short taped 
stories.  In one version, the couple agrees that they don’t want children, but don’t get married, 
and in the other version, they disagree about having children, but end up happily married.  
Subjects were given the information about the outcome (married or engagement broken) in 
the last line of the story.  Two week later, subjects were contacted by phone and were asked to 
free-recall the story.  The results showed that subjects in the emotional focus condition 
recalled significantly fewer accurate story elements than those in the factual focus condition.  
Of particular interest was the finding that subjects in the emotional focus condition were more 
likely than subjects in the factual focus condition to make integrative distortions; they were  
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significantly more likely to distort the story to make it internally consistent (e.g., by having 
the couple who disagreed about children later break up).  Thinking about one’s reactions to an 
event rather than thinking about the details of the event led people to remember the event as 
being more coherent.  Mather & Johnson (1998) explanation for their study’s findings was 
that making subjects think about their own emotional reactions during encoding created an 
emotional context for the story.  At the time of test (after a delay) they wrongly interpreted 
their emotional assessment of the outcome as factual details of the story. 
Marsh, Tversky, & Hutson (2004) examined the consequences of emotional versus 
factual retellings within an eyewitness paradigm.  Subjects in the study viewed a violent scene 
from a movie.  Afterwards, subjects in the factual focus condition were asked to verbally 
report the events in the film in the order they occurred, and to provide as much detail as 
possible.  Subjects in the affective focus condition were asked to talk about their emotional 
reactions to the film, their thoughts and feelings.  The subjects in the control conditions did 
not talk about the film.  Following a delay, each of the subjects completed five memory tasks: 
a perpetrator recall task, free recall of the film, an emotion memory test, cued-recall 
questions, and a picture recognition test.  They found that having subjects talking about their 
emotions led to better memory for one’s emotions, but also led to subjectivity and a greater 
proportion of major errors in the free-recall.  They also found that factual accounts were 
longer than emotional ones, and contained more perceptual detail, including spatial, temporal, 
and activity elements of the event.  The emotional accounts contained far more expressions of 
affect and feelings as well as references to self.  The major finding was that the very act of 
talking about the witnessed event led to changes in the memory, and the focus of retelling 
affected those changes.  Importantly, having subjects focused on emotion while reviewing 
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the event led to factual errors when they later recounted the original event. 
Eyewitness Suggestibility 
Eyewitness suggestibility is thought of as the extent to which people exposed to an 
event come to report information that had been suggested to them in a post-event 
questionnaire as seen or heard in the witnessed event.  In eyewitness suggestibility studies 
(e.g., Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), participants are exposed to a videotape or slide sequence 
depicting a crime.  Next, they read a narrative describing the witnessed event or answer 
questions about it.  Thus, the participants are exposed to misleading suggestions (e.g., that a 
thief stole a ring when he had not) through the narrative or questions.  Finally, participants are 
tested on their memory for the event.  Suggestibility is indicated by the extent to which 
participants report the misleading information as being from the witnessed event.  Earlier 
research proposed that the underlying mechanism for eyewitness suggestibility involves the 
incorporation of suggested information into a witness memory for the event (e.g., Loftus, 
Miller, & Burns, 1978; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a).  Later research supports a different 
view; specifically, that errors observed in eyewitness suggestibility can be characterized as 
source misattributions (Johnson, et al., 1993; Lindsay, 1994; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994, 
although c.f., Eakin, Schreiber, & Sergent-Marshall, 2003).  Thus, participants are 
misattributing information obtained from a post-event source to the witnessed event.  In the 
context of the SMF (Johnson, et al., 1993), these source misattributions (i.e., misattributing 
post-event items to the event) can increase as the similarity of event items and suggested 
items is increased.  For example, Zaragoza & Lane (1994, Exp. 1) found that putting 
suggestions in the context of a questionnaire increased source misattribution errors relative to 
when the suggestions occurred in a narrative.  Specifically, they argued that participants are  
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more likely to form a visual image of the suggested items (reinstating the original event) when 
answering the questions than when reading the narrative (see Zaragoza, Lane, Ackil, & 
Chambers, 1996, for a study that directly manipulated imagery), and thus their memories of 
suggested items were more likely to include perceptual and contextual detail consistent with 
having seen the items in the event. 
Although there is vast quantity of research on eyewitness suggestibility, to date only 
one study has specifically manipulated the emotionality of the stimuli (although the study 
does not employ a standard eyewitness suggestibility design).  Porter, Spencer, & Birt (2003) 
examined suggestibility using a modified paradigm.  Subjects viewed either a series of eight 
highly positive, neutral, or highly negative emotional scenes (pictures were selected from the 
International Affective Picture System).  After each picture, they had to verbally provide a 
description of the picture they just saw and their responses were recorded.  Half of the 
subjects in each of the three emotional conditions (positive, negative and neutral) were asked 
to verbally answer 10 questions in the format of a post-event questionnaire, with half of the 
questions containing misleading information.  The remaining subjects were not exposed to the 
misleading questions.  All the subjects took a free recall memory test followed by 10 open-
ended questions.  They found that the inclusion of misinformation in the context of the 
questionnaire had a significant impairing effect on accuracy; misled subjects were less 
accurate (42.6%) to questions related to misinformation than nonmisled Ss (79.5%).  For 
misled subjects, there were no overall differences in the accuracy of the memories for either 
the positive, neutral, and negative scenes.  However, when broken down by item type, it was 
found that subjects in the negative emotion condition recalled fewer central details than those 
in the positive condition; they also recalled more peripheral details and emotion-oriented  
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details than those subjects in the neutral condition.  Perhaps the most important finding of the 
study was the fact that emotion had a clear impact on susceptibility to the misinformation.  
Subjects who saw the highly negative scenes were twice as likely to recall seeing a suggested 
item in the pictures as those in the other two conditions.  It should be noted that, unlike 
traditional suggestibility studies, this study did not use control items to assess the degree of 
suggestibility of subjects. 
Individual Differences in Affect Intensity 
Although emotion can affect memory (e.g., Heuer & Reisberg, 1990), not everyone 
appears to experience emotion to the same intensity.  Larsen, Diener, & Emmons (1986) 
examined individual differences in affective responsiveness to emotional provoking stimuli in 
two experiments using naturally occurring life events.  According to their view, some 
individuals modulate the intensity of emotional stimuli such that they consistently experience 
stronger or more intense emotional reactions.  Other individuals are less emotionally reactive 
to similar levels of emotion-provoking stimulation.  In Experiment 1, subjects recorded two 
events per day for eight consecutive weeks and rated their affective reactions to those events 
on “goodness” to “badness” scale.  In addition to subjects’ subjective ratings, a team of 
independent raters using a similar scale also rated these events (objective event ratings).  In 
Experiment 2, subjects took a standardized life event description questionnaire using a 10-
point response scale, with each point describing affective reactions of varying intensity.  
Based on their responses to the AIM, subjects were divided in high and low affect-intensity 
groups.  The AIM is a 40-item questionnaire used to assess the characteristic strength or 
intensity with which an individual typically experiences his or her emotions.  Items from the 
AIM were written based on a construct definition of affect intensity that emphasize the  
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distinction between frequency of emotional experiences (e.g., “I am happy quite often”) and 
intensity of experienced emotion (e.g., “When I am happy the feeling is one of intense joy”).  
The AIM had been found to correlate significantly with measures of peripheral physiological 
arousal, and to assess the general tendency to experience emotions more strongly, regardless 
of their direction (i.e., positive or negative).  Larsen, Diener, & Emmons (1986) reported 
consistent findings across both experiments.  They found that subjects scoring high on the 
AIM reacted more strongly to the naturally occurring events in their lives than subjects’ low 
on the AIM, regardless of whether those events evoked positive or negative emotions.  
Furthermore, subjects’ high on AIM were found to respond with more intense emotions to 
moderate and low levels of affective stimulation. 
In a follow up study, Larsen, Diener, & Cropanzano (1987) examined the idea that 
individual differences in affect intensity are related to how people interpret emotional stimuli, 
specifically, whether individuals high on affect-intensity differ from individuals on low 
affect-intensity in terms of the cognitive processes they engage during exposure to 
emotionally relevant stimuli.  In the first phase of the study, subjects completed the AIM and 
subjects were divided into high (75th percentile and above) and low (25th percentile and 
below) levels of affect intensity.  In the laboratory phase, subjects viewed twice a series of 15 
slides depicting positive, negative and neutral affect stimuli.  After the first exposure to the 
slides, the experimenter prompted the subjects after each slide to write down “anything that 
went through your mind when you looked at the slides the first time.”  All the responses were 
scored along eight separate rating dimensions that tapped into different cognitive constructs: 
physical sensations, emotional arousal (served as manipulation checks for the effectiveness of 
the slides to induce emotion), personalizing statements and empathic statements (assessed  
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aspects of personalization), global generalization and fantasy elaboration (assessed aspects of 
overgeneralization) and focus of feelings and emotion details (assessed selective abstraction).  
Larsen, Diener & Cropanzano (1987) reported that emotional slides (positive and negative) 
prompted subjects high on AI to report more physical sensations and more emotional arousal 
than they did during the neutral slides.  Subjects high on affect-intensity dimension were 
found to engage in more personalizing, generalizing and empathic cognitions as well as more 
global and elaborate thinking than subjects low in this dimension.  They also reported that 
group differences were found only in response to emotional stimuli, not in response to 
nonemotional or neutral stimuli (i.e., high affect-intensity subjects did not engage in these 
cognitive processes during exposure to neutral stimuli).  What is also important is the fact that 
the cognitive processes that discriminated between high and low individuals generalized 
across positive as well negative emotions.  The results of this study support the idea that 
individuals that have the tendency to have strong emotional responses also have the tendency 
to deploy different type of cognitive processes when exposed to emotional stimuli than 
individuals low in AI. 
Finally, Larsen, Billings, & Cutler (1996) examined individual differences in how 
people cognitively interpret emotional situations in terms of active information generation 
(i.e., the amount of specific useful information and distinctive detail individuals convey in 
their account of an emotional event).  In the first phase of the study, subjects completed the 
AIM and the first part of the Event Description Questionnaire (EDQ1).  The EDQ1 consisted 
of eight events evenly balanced between pleasant (e.g., being accepted into your top-choice 
graduate school) and unpleasant (e.g., having your house burn down) events.  For each event, 
subjects had to provide a detailed description of that event.  Subjects returned 4-6 weeks later  
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and completed the second part of the EDQ.  The free-response descriptions were coded for 
content along five informational styles variables: emotional content, focus on feelings, 
informativeness, personalizing, and generalizing.  They reported that the descriptive 
information generated by the high AI subjects contained significantly more references to 
emotional arousal, more focus on feelings, and more overgeneralization compared to subjects 
low in AI.  The authors argued that their findings were consistent with the notion that specific 
cognitive processing could be associated with dispositional affect intensity.  In addition, the 
authors concluded that people’s informational style is stable over time and across situations. 
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HYPOTHESES 
The present study examined the effect of emotional arousal and focus of attention on 
subjects’ memory for a witnessed event.  The intent of the study was to explore why witnesses 
exposed to highly emotional events can sometimes provide a very accurate description of the 
event and, while at other times, their memory is impaired.  A second goal was to examine the 
effect of emotion on witness suggestibility. 
Although emotional arousal can increase retention of the memory for the event (e.g., by 
increasing the release of adrenaline; Cahill, et al., 1994), one key variable that may moderate 
its effect on memory accuracy is the focus of attention at the time of encoding.  For instance, 
when attention is focused on the perceptual and physical details of the event (although note 
that sometimes this attention might be focused on the arousing elements of the event more 
than on more peripheral elements), memory will generally be accurate relative to a neutral 
event.  In contrast, when emotional events lead people to focus their attention elsewhere (e.g., 
one’s thoughts or feelings about the arousing situation), then one would expect less accurate 
and detailed memories.  This relatively poorer memory may also make emotionally aroused 
subjects more suggestible when exposed to post-event information. 
In the present study, the goal was to investigate, in the context of the eyewitness 
suggestibility paradigm, the effect of emotional arousal and attentional focus.  Subjects 
watched either an emotional or a neutral event in a series of slides while focusing their 
attention either on perceptual detail, on their own thoughts or feelings (self-focus), or on 
details of their own choice (i.e., the no-focus control condition).  After the slide presentation, 
subjects answered questions about the event that contained some misleading information.  
Finally, subjects completed a source memory test. 
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The primary measure of interest was the tendency of subjects to misremember 
witnessing the suggested items in the event, although performance on event (slide) items was 
also of interest.  To the extent that exposing subjects to an emotional rather than to a neutral 
type of event leads to greater arousal, this type of manipulation should lead to an increase in 
accurate memory for event details and also an increase in misattributions to witnessed event.  
The first hypothesis was that subjects in the emotional condition would show enhanced 
memory for the witnessed event compared to those subjects in the neutral condition, 
particularly for the second phase that contained the arousing stimuli (Burke, Heuer, & 
Reisberg, 1992; Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Laney, Campbell, Heuer, 
& Reisberg, 2004).  The second hypothesis was that subjects in the emotional condition would 
show increased susceptibility to post event misinformation compared to those subjects in the 
neutral condition (Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003). 
In this study, subjects focused on different aspects of the witnessed event (perceptual 
detail, self-focus, and no-focus).  Because it was expected that this manipulation would lead 
to differences in the type of characteristics encoded during the event, we expected that the 
types of information available at retrieval would vary (e.g., Johnson, et al., 1996).  These 
differences were likely to increase or decrease subjects’ ability to accurately attribute test 
items to their appropriate source.  For example, it was expected that the self-focus subjects 
would focus on their own thoughts and feelings at the expense of encoding perceptual details 
about the event.  Conversely, perceptual detail subjects would focus on the perceptual details 
(e.g., shape, color, location, etc.) of elements of the event.  Further, these perceptual details 
were precisely the type of details that would help subjects distinguish between their memories 
of event items and memories of items they encountered in the questions.  Thus the third  
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hypothesis was that this differential focus at encoding would make self-focus subjects’ less 
able to accurately remember information from the slides, less able to reject misinformation 
introduced during the questionnaire, and more likely to attribute suggestions to the witnessed 
event.  It was also expected that perceptual focus subjects, because of the relatively greater 
perceptual detail available to them at retrieval, would to be less likely to misattribute 
suggested items to the event than either of the other two conditions.  In addition to the main 
effect of type of focus it was also expected that there would be an interaction of event type 
and focus type.  Specifically, it was expected that self-focus subjects who viewed the 
emotional slide sequence should show the poorest event memory and the greatest 
suggestibility.  This hypothesis was based on the supposition that the emotional stimuli would 
lead self focus subjects to think about emotional aspects of the slides more than when they 
view neutral stimuli, which should interfere with encoding or rehearsal of perceptual details. 
Although it is clear that memory is affected by emotional arousal, the role of individual 
differences in moderating this process is not as clear.  Thus, a secondary goal of this study 
was to assess the potential role of responsiveness to emotional stimuli.  Specifically, the 
possible relationship between the personality dimension of affect intensity and eyewitness 
performance was explored.  The short Affect Intensity Measure (Geuens, & DePelsmacker, 
2002) is a 20-item questionnaire (see Appendix A) that was used to assess the characteristic 
intensity with which individuals experience their emotions, regardless of the direction.  
Individuals high on AI experience their emotions quite strongly and are emotionally reactive 
and variable.  Individuals low on AI experience their emotions mildly and with only minor 
fluctuations.  The fourth hypothesis was that high AI subjects would show poorer memory for 
event items and be more suggestible than low AI subjects.  This prediction was based on 
 19
the findings of previous research that individuals high on AI were likely to focus on their 
emotional reactions to the stimuli, while those low in AI were less likely to do so.  Similar to 
the effect of attentional focus, it was expected that AI would affect the degree to which 
subjects would encode the perceptual details that were essential for discriminating between 
event and suggested items.  These differences in the completeness of the memory for the 
witnessed event could make those individuals high on AI more likely to accept suggested 
items in the questionnaire and later attribute suggested items to the slides. Thus, this would 
also predict that the effect would be most pronounced in self-focus Ss who viewed the 
emotional arousal slide sequence.  Thus, it was expected that there would be an interaction 
between event type, focus type and AI dimension.  Specifically low AIM subjects in the 
perceptual focus condition who viewed the neutral slides should show best memory for event 
and be less suggestible than the other conditions, and high AIM subjects in the self-focus 
condition who viewed the emotional slides should show the worst event memory and highest 
suggestibility.  However, I note that his prediction of a three-way interaction is somewhat 
speculative as high AI subjects might already show high levels of self-focused encoding even 
without instructions to focus on their emotions (Thus, predicting two-way interactions 
between event type and AIM, and between event type and focus type). 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
Subjects (Ss) were two hundred sixty undergraduate students at Louisiana State 
University recruited from psychology classes, and who received course credit for their 
participation in the experiment.  Ss were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental 
conditions: control/neutral (n = 44), perceptual/neutral (n = 43), self/neutral (n = 42), 
control/emotional (n = 43), perceptual/emotional (n = 43), and self/emotional (n = 45). 
Design 
This study used a 2X2X3X3 factorial design, with type of presentation (arousal and 
neutral), affect intensity (high and low), and type of focus (perceptual, self, and control) as 
between-subjects variables, and slide phase (1,2, and 3) as a within-subjects variable. 
Materials 
The materials that were used for the present study were originally developed by Heuer 
& Reisberg (1990) and expanded by Cahill & McGaugh (1995) and consisted of a neutral or 
an emotional story presented during a sequence of slides.  The neutral story is rather boring 
and uneventful and tells the story of a woman and her son who visit the boy’s father at the 
hospital where he works.  On the way to the hospital they witness a relatively routine aspect 
of a disaster drill of a simulated accident.  The boy stays with his father and the mother goes 
to pick-up her younger son from the preschool.  The emotional story tells a different story 
while the same images are presented.  On the way to the hospital to visit the father, the boy is 
the victim of a very serious car accident in which his feet are severed.  He is rushed to the 
hospital, where a team of specialized surgeons reattaches his feet.  The boy stays in the 
hospital (attended by the father) and the distraught mother leaves to pick up her son from the 
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preschool. 
Each version of the story—neutral and emotional—consisted of same sequence of 11 
slides and a different narrative accompanied each.  The narrative, which was recorded by a 
male voice, was the crucial aspect of manipulation.  The same pictures which were described 
in the neutral version as relatively routine aspects of a disaster drill watched by the boy are 
described in the arousal version as an attempt to save the boy’s life.  Specifically, a picture of 
badly scarred legs is described in the neutral version as merely an actor made up to appear 
injured for the disaster drill, but in the arousal version is described as the boy after his feet 
have been reattached by surgeons.  The narration accompanying the first four slides was 
identical in both stories and highly similar for the last three slides.  The narration differed 
between the two versions mainly during the middle five slides (see Appendix B). 
For the purpose of our study we tailored the presentation mode (i.e., slide sequence) in 
order to accommodate the focus type manipulation that required that Ss pay attention to 
different aspects of the event.  As a result, each slide accompanied by its appropriate narrative 
(i.e., neutral and emotional story) was presented for approximately 20 seconds.  The end of 
narration for each slide was followed by 5 seconds of silence, during which the slide remained 
in view.  An additional 11 slides were interspersed between the original 11 slides in order to 
accommodate the focus manipulation.  For the two focus conditions (perceptual and the self-
focus) these slides contained a rating scale and were presented for approximatively 5 seconds.  
In the no-focus control condition, these slides remained blank for the same amount of time. 
The post-event questionnaire consisted of 20 questions about the slides sequence.  The 
questionnaire contained questions about specific aspects (i.e., forensically relevant aspects of 
each slide such as perceptual and physical descriptions of objects and people) of each of the  
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11 slides.  Some of the statements contained misleading items that had not been in the slides.  
These items supplemented rather than contradicted what Ss had seen (as in Zaragoza & Lane, 
1994) in the slides and the items were not the direct object of the questions.  For example, for 
the suggestion “Mother and son waited patiently at the light to cross the street.”  The Ss were 
asked, “In the fourth slide, they are standing at the edge of the walkway waiting for the red 
light to change.  Was the mother holding the boy’s hand?”  Across the experiment there were 
a total of 12 critical statements: a ramp, a microscope, the light, framed picture, running shoe, 
ambulance, red sock, bloody bandages, basketball, bench, tissue, older men.  There were four 
versions of the questionnaire, two for the emotional story and two for neutral story, and each 
version six critical items functioned as never presented control items (i.e., they did not appear 
until the final test), and six critical items functioned as suggested items.  Each of the two slide 
series was subdivided into three phases according to the plot of the story: first phase—slides 
before the arousal manipulation was introduced, second phase—slides where the arousal 
manipulation took place, and third phase—slides following the manipulation.  Two 
misleading items were suggested for each of the three parts of the slide sequence.  An equal 
number of Ss in both neutral and emotional conditions received each version. 
The source memory test consisted of 24 test statements administered on a computer.  
Six of the statements were suggested only in the post-event questionnaire, 6 statements were 
critical items that had never been suggested (control items), 6 statements concerned items that 
were only depicted in the slides, and 6 statements concerned items that were both in the slides 
and in the questionnaire.  For each item type (e.g., slide-only), 1/3 of the items were from the 
1st third of the sequence, 1/3 of the items were from the 2nd third of the sequence, and 1/3 
were from the last third of the sequence. 
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The Short Affect Intensity Measure (Geuens & DePelsmacker, 2002) is a 20-item 
questionnaire that assesses the characteristic strength or intensity with which an individual 
typically experiences his or her emotions. 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested in groups of up to six.  Upon arrival in the lab, Ss were told that 
they would participate in a memory experiment.  Ss were next informed that they would be 
watching a set of slides, and that some of the slides would be pleasant, some unpleasant, and 
some neutral.  Further, they were told that the slide presentation should be viewed as a film 
and that their continuous attention would be necessary and vital for the accurate assessment of 
their memory for the presented material.  In addition, Ss were informed that the best 
performance on the subsequent test would be awarded with a $25.  Those more general 
instructions were followed by instructions that were specific to focus condition.  Ss received 
the instructions according to the type of attention focus group (i.e., perceptual condition, self-
focus condition, or control) to which they were assigned.  Ss assigned to the perceptual detail 
condition were instructed as follows: “I would like you to pay attention to the events in the 
slide sequence, to the order in which they occur, and to any physical and perceptual details 
depicted in the slides.”  Self-focus participants were told: “I would like you to pay attention to 
your emotional reactions, to your own thoughts you have in reaction to the events depicted in 
the slides.”  The Ss assigned to the control condition were instructed: “I would like you to pay 
attention to the events depicted in the slides.” 
After the presentation of each slide, perceptual focus participants saw on the computer 
screen a slide containing short instructions that asked them to think back to the details they 
saw in the previous slide, and to rate the complexity of the details on a 1-5 scale with 1  
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representing not complex at all, and 5 meaning very complex.  Self-focus participants saw on 
the computer screen a slide that asked them to think back to the feelings and emotions they 
experienced while watching the previous slide, and to rate their emotional reactions to it on a 
1-5 scale with 1 meaning no emotion at all and 5 meaning very emotional.  Ss assigned to the 
control condition did not make any ratings.  The rating slides were presented to the Ss for 5 
seconds and they had to make their responses by pressing the appropriate key as directed in 
the instructions. 
After viewing the slide sequence, Ss worked on the post-event questionnaire (this task 
was self-paced).  After finishing the questionnaire, Ss worked on a word puzzle filler task 
until 15 minutes had elapsed. 
Instructions for the source memory test were similar to those used in Zaragoza & Lane 
(1994).  Ss were informed that for each of the 24 statements they would see they would have 
to indicate the correct source of the information.  For each statement they had 4 possible 
sources to choose from: Slides Only, Questionnaire Only, Both the Slides and the 
Questionnaire, and Neither the Slides nor the Questionnaire.  The test was self-paced. 
Following completion of the source memory test, Ss took the short Affect Intensity 
Measure.  Ss were given 10 minutes to complete the AIM and they received the following 
instructions: “The following questions refer to emotional reactions to typical life-events.  
Please indicate how YOU react to these events by placing a number from the following scale 
in the blank space preceding each item.  Please base your answers on how YOU react, not on 
how you think others react or how you think a person should react.”  The Ss used a 6-point 
response format, with each point anchored to a brief phrase describing affective reactions of 
varying intensity, with 1 meaning “I never feel like that” and 6 meaning “I always feel like 
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that.”  Lastly, Ss completed the demographic questionnaire together with a post-experiment 
questionnaire and they were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
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RESULTS 
Both absolute and conditionalized measures of source memory are reported.  All 
analyses were conducted with an alpha level of .05.  The proportions of accurate responses 
(i.e., slides–only, questions-only, and control) are provided in Table 1, and source 
misattribution errors (i.e., suggested items attributed to slides and control items attributed to 
slides) are provided in Table 2. 
TABLE 1: Proportion of Accurate Responses on the Source Test by Focus and Event Type 
Item Type Neutral Event Emotional Event 
 C P S C P S 
Slides Only .45 (.03) .47 (.03) .46 (.03) .44 (.03) .48 (.03) .46 (.03) 
Questions Only .28 (.03) .16 (.03) .24 (.03) .25 (.03) .26 (.03) .25 (.03) 
Control Only .64 (.03) .67 (.03) .63 (.03) .64 (.03) .65 (.03) .68 (.03) 
Both Only .64 (.03) .65 (.04) .65 (.04) .64 (.04) .67 (.04) .71 (.03) 
Note.  Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
 
The data were first analyzed using a mixed model ANOVA, with type of event 
(emotional/neutral) and type of focus (perceptual, self and control) as between-subjects 
factors, and phase of the slides (1-3) as a within-subject factor run separately for each item 
type (slides only, questionnaire only items, and control items).  The analyses are reported 
separately by item type below.  To simplify reporting, I note that there were no main effects 
of focus type, nor were there any significant interactions involving this variable.  Thus, 
subjects were equally accurate (or inaccurate) regardless of the type of focus they adopted at 
encoding.  Thus subsequent analyses report data collapsed across this factor. 
TABLE 2: Proportion of Inaccurate Responses on the Source Test by Focus and Event Type 
Item Type Neutral Event Emotional Event 
 C P S C P S 
Suggestions to Slides .43 (.04) .50 (.04) .46 (.04) .52 (.04) .52 (.04) .50 (.04) 
Controls to Slides .32 (.03) .38 (.03) .36 (.03) .32 (.03) .31 (.03) .29 (.03) 
Note.  Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Slide Items 
These analyses focused on accurate attribution of items seen in the slides.  The analysis 
revealed a main effect of phase (F (2,508) = 11.09, p < .05, ηp2= .04), and a marginally 
significant interaction of phase by type of event (F (2,508) = 2.96, p = .052, ηp2= .01, See 
Figure 1).  All other results revealed no significant differences (All Fs < 1.71, n.s.). 
In order to explore the interaction, we compared neutral and emotional event conditions 
at each phase.  The only significant comparison was for phase 2 (F (1,259) = 3.72, p < .05, 
ηp2= .01; all other Fs < 1.59, n.s.).  Specifically, subjects in emotional event condition were 
more likely to correctly attribute slide items to slides on the source test (M = .55) than those 
in the neutral event condition (M = .47) in the arousal phase of the slide sequence. 
Next, item recognition for slide items was computed (i.e., Attribution of slides to the 
slides + misattribution to questions + attributions to both sources).  The analysis revealed only 
a main effect of phase (F (2,516) = 34.95, p < .05, ηp2= .12), and a significant interaction of 
phase by type of event (F (2,516) = 3.81, p < .05, ηp2= .02).  In order to explore the 
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FIGURE 1. Average Proportion of Slide Items Correctly Attributed to Slides by Event Type 
and Phase of Presentation. 
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interaction, we compared neutral and emotional event conditions at each phase.  The only 
significant comparison was for phase 3 (F (1,259) = 4.80, p < .05; for phase 2, M = .57 and 
.51 for emotional and neutral, respectively, F (1,258) = 2.42, p = .12; for phase 1, F < 1).  
Specifically, subjects in emotional event condition were less likely to recognize slide items 
(M = .61) than those in the neutral event condition (M = .70) in the 3rd phase of the slide 
sequence.  Because potential recognition differences may affect the interpretation of source 
attribution, a conditionalized measure of source memory was computed.  Specifically, the 
proportion of recognized slide items that were correctly attributed to the slides was examined.  
Analyses revealed that there was a main effect of phase (F (2,246) = 18.01, p < .05, ηp2= .13).  
Conditionalized accurate attributions to slides were significantly lower in the 3rd phase (M = 
.74) than in the 1st (M = .92) and 2nd (M = .95) phases (which did not differ from each other).  
Unlike the unconditionalized analysis reported above, there was no significant phase by type 
of event interaction (F < 1).  However, it should be noted that performance was near ceiling in 
the first two phases, thus it may have been difficult to detect differences, particularly in the 
critical 2nd phase.  Given the above analyses, it appears that the arousal manipulation 
decreased item recognition more than it decreased a bias to accurately attribute items to the 
slides. 
Suggested Items 
The suggestibility of Ss (i.e., the likelihood they claim to have seen in the slides items 
which were only suggested in the questionnaire) was next examined.  The mixed factorial 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of Phase (F (2,508) = 99.06, p < .05, ηp2= .28, See Figure 2).  
Subjects misattributed more suggested items to the slides in the 1st and 3rd phases (M = .60 for 
both) than in the 2nd phase (M = .27).  In addition, there was a trend toward a main effect of 
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event type (M = .47 and .42 for Emotion and Neutral conditions, respectively, F (1,258) = 
2.67, p = .10, ηp2= .01).  No other interaction reached significance (All Fs < 1.52, n.s.). 
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FIGURE 2. Average Proportion of Suggested Items Misattributed to Slides by Event Type 
and Phase of Presentation. 
 
Next, item recognition for suggested items was computed (i.e., Attribution of suggested 
items to the slides + misattribution to questions + attributions to both sources).  The analysis 
revealed a main effect of phase (F (2,508) = 159.89, p < .05, ηp2= .38), a main effect of event 
type (M = .77 and .69, F (1,254) = 12.19, p < .05, ηp2= .05), and a significant interaction of 
phase by type of event (F (2,508) = 4.78, p < .05, ηp2= .02).  In order to explore the 
interaction, neutral and emotional event conditions were compared at each phase.  Subjects 
who viewed the emotional event were more likely to recognize suggested items than neutral 
conditions subjects in the 1st (M = .82 and .74) 2nd (M = .57 and .41) phases, but not the third 
phase (M = .92 for both). 
Because of item recognition differences, a conditionalized measure of source memory 
for suggestions was computed.  Analyses revealed that there was a main effect of phase (F 
(2,354) = 21.80, p < .05, ηp2= .11).  Conditionalized inaccurate attributions to slides were  
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significantly higher in the 1st phase (M = .78), significantly lower in the 3rd phase (M = .65) 
and significantly lowest in the 2nd phase (M = .54).  There was no significant phase by type of 
event interaction (F < 2.36, n.s.).  Thus the impact of emotion on suggestibility appears 
primarily a function of increased item recognition rather than increased tendency to attribute 
suggested items to the event. 
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FIGURE 3. Average Proportion of Control Items Misattributed to Slides by Event and Phase 
of Presentation. 
 
Control Items 
Next, subjects’ misattribution of control items to the event (i.e., those items never presented in 
the slide sequence or questionnaire and seen only in the source test).  The mixed factorial 
ANOVA showed a main effect of phase (F (2,508) = 77.84, p < .05, ηp2= .24).  Subjects were 
most likely to misattribute control items from the 1st phase (M = .47), next most likely to 
misattribute control items from the 3rd phase (M = .35) and least likely to do so for phase 2 (M 
= .16).  There was also a significant effect of event type (F (1,254) = 4.34, p < 05, ηp2= .02), 
with the neutral condition subjects attributing more control items to the slides (M = .35) than 
emotional condition subjects (M = .31) see Table 3. 
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Suggestibility Effect 
Lastly, the suggestibility effect was examined.  Specifically, the misattribution of 
suggested items versus control items was compared.  The utility of this measure is that it 
allows one to explore the impact of a variable on the processing of postevent suggestions 
relative to its impact on never-presented (but schema-consistent) control items.  For each 
participant, the proportion of control items misattributed to the slides was subtracted from the 
proportion of suggested items misattributed to the slides (data was collapsed across phases).  
A one-way ANOVA showed that the suggestibility effect for emotional event condition was 
significantly larger (M= .21) than the effect for neutral event condition (M= .11, F (1,260) = 
7.91, p < 05, ηp2= .03).  Thus, subjects who viewed the emotional event were more 
suggestible than subjects who viewed the neutral event.  Table 3 summarizes the major 
findings regarding the impact of emotion on event memory. 
TABLE 3: Proportion of Overall Accurate and Inaccurate Attributions to Item Types by Event 
Type. 
Item Type Neutral Event Emotional Event p= 
Slides Accuracy .46 (.02) .46 (.02) .94 
Suggestions to Slides .46 (.02) .51 (.02) .10 
Control to Slides .35 (.02) .30 (.02) .04 
Suggestibility Effect .11 (.00) .21 (.00) .01 
Note.  Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
Individual Differences in Affect Intensity 
In order to examine the possible relationship between the personality dimension of 
affect intensity and Ss’ memory for the witnessed event, a subjective emotional response 
rating for AIM was created.  The scoring procedure for AIM (as recommended in Larsen & 
Diener, 1987; Guens & DePelsmacker, 2002) involves rekeying the reversed items (see 
Appendix: A, Factor 3) and averaging responses across the 20 items.  A 2 X 3 ANOVA with 
type of event (neutral and emotional) and focus type (control, perceptual, and self focus) as 
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TABLE 4: Proportion of Items Attributed to the Event by Focus and Median Split AIM 
Scores for Neutral Event. 
Neutral Event Item Type 
Low AIM High AIM 
 N C N P N S N C N P N S 
Slides Only 24 .47 (.04) 24 .49 (.04) 21 .46 (.04) 20 .42 (.05) 19 .47 (.05) 21 .45 (.04) 
Suggestions 24 .43 (.05) 24 .53 (.05) 21 .52 (.05) 20 .43 (.06) 19 .47 (.06) 21 .41 (.05) 
Errors 24 .35 (.04) 24 .40 (.04) 21 .33 (.04) 20 .28 (.04) 19 .36 (.04) 21 .38 (.04) 
Note.  Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
between variables was used to analyze for possible differences in AIM scores.  The results 
revealed no significant differences between conditions (All Fs < 2.16, n.s); the overall AIM 
mean was 3.66. 
Next, a high and low AI factor was created by using a median split.  A 2X2X3X3 
factorial design, with type of presentation (arousal and neutral), affect intensity (high and 
low), and type of focus (perceptual, self, and control) as between-subjects variables, and slide 
phase (1,2, and 3) as within-subjects variable was run separately for each item type (slides 
only, questionnaire only, both slides and questionnaire or control items).  The proportions of 
items attributed to the slides for the neutral and emotional event are provided in Table 4 and 
5.  The level of AIM score had no significant impact on any dependent measures.  Finally, the 
correlations between AIM scores and attributions to the event for each item type were 
computed separately for event type.  None of the correlations were significant.  Thus, 
regardless of type of analysis, affect intensity (as measured by AIM) does not appear to have 
an impact on event memory. 
TABLE 5: Proportion of Items Attributed to the Event by Focus and Median Split AIM 
Scores for Emotional Event. (Standard errors are provided in parentheses.) 
Emotional Event Item Type 
Low AIM High AIM 
 N C N P N S N C N P N S 
Slides Only 25 .47 (.04) 22 .47 (.04) 23 .48 (.04) 18 .42 (.05) 21 .46 (.04) 22 .43 (.04) 
Suggestions 25 .53 (.05) 22 .47 (.05) 23 .46 (.05) 18 .51 (.06) 21 .58 (.05) 22 .54 (.05) 
Errors 25 .29 (.04) 22 .31 (.04) 23 .27 (.04) 18 .36 (.04) 21 .31 (.04) 22 .30 (.04) 
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DISCUSSION 
In summary, the results of this study demonstrate that exposing subjects to an emotional 
event can have important consequences on memory for the event and misattribution errors 
(i.e., suggestibility).  Specifically, the emotional manipulation appeared to enhance accurate 
source attributions of items from the second (arousal) phase of the slides to the witnessed 
event.  Thus, there is some support for the first hypothesis.  In addition, this study provides 
some empirical support that exposure to an emotional event increases overall suggestibility.  
First, there was a trend toward greater suggestibility for those phases subsequent to the 
arousal manipulation (i.e., phases 2 & 3).  Thus, there is some evidence that subjects in the 
emotional condition more often misattributed the suggested items to the event than those in 
the neutral condition (hypothesis two).  However, for control items this pattern was reversed, 
as subjects in emotional condition were significantly less likely to misattribute never-
presented control items to the event than neutral conditions subjects.  Further, the magnitude 
of the suggestibility effect (misattributions of suggested vs controls) was significantly larger 
when subjects had seen the emotional event than when they had viewed the neutral event.  
Thus, the overall pattern of findings suggest that emotional arousal may make the witnessed 
event more memorable while at the same time making subjects more vulnerable to misleading 
post-event information.  The results clearly failed to support the third hypothesis; that 
differential focus at encoding would make self focus subjects’ less able to accurately 
remember information from the slides, less able to reject misinformation introduced during 
the questionnaire, and more likely to attribute suggestions to the witnessed event than 
perceptual focus participants.  Lastly, the fourth hypothesis of the study also failed to receive 
support.  High AI subjects and low AI subjects showed similar performance on event and 
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suggested items.  The implications of the present study’s findings together with possible 
explanations are discussed below. 
The finding that enhanced recognition for slides for the emotional compared to neutral 
subjects in the phase two of the witnessed event can only be attributed to the arousal 
manipulation.  Participants viewed exactly the same series of slides and the only difference 
between the conditions was the nature of the accompanying narrative.  This finding is 
important because the present study replicates the recognition findings reported by Burke, 
Heuer, & Reisberg (1992) and Cahill and McGaugh (1995) thus, these results join that of 
previous researchers in suggesting emotional arousal can increase event memory. 
Although there was an increase in event memory as a function of emotional arousal 
(albeit, only for the 2nd phase), there was also an increase in suggestibility in all phases.  This 
finding is important because the present study replicates the suggestibility findings reported 
by Porter, Spencer, & Birt (2003) and thus these results join that of previous researchers in 
suggesting emotional arousal can increase suggestibility. 
There are three possible explanations for this impact, and they parallel the theories 
offered for the impact of emotion on memory discussed in the introduction (e.g., Burke, et al., 
1992; Cahill & McGaugh, 1995).  First, the attentional narrowing mechanism proposed by 
Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg (1992) claims that emotional arousal promotes better memory for 
the central elements of the event and poorer memory for those peripheral aspects of the event.  
According to the view, emotional arousal could have increased event memory and 
suggestibility if event details were relatively more central and suggested items relatively more 
peripheral.  When reading the suggested items in the post-event questionnaire, arousal 
subjects would be more likely to incorporate them into their memory of the event because the  
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items are less likely to conflict with their memory of peripheral event items than for neutral 
subjects.  Thus, emotional subjects would show poorer discrepancy detection during the post-
event questionnaire (Tousignant et al., 1986).  Although the present study did not manipulate 
the central and peripheral aspects of the witnessed events, a comparison between the present 
study slide items and those of Cahill & McGaugh (1995) shows that the present study’s slide 
items could be considered relatively peripheral.  For example, in the critical second phase, the 
slide items referred to a lamp above the operating table and the mother had her hands in her 
pockets.  Although the suggested items were often peripheral (e.g., bloody bandages on the 
operating table), others were relatively central (an ambulance at the scene of the accident).  
Thus, this account of the results seems unlikely. 
An alternative explanation comes from Cahill & McGaugh (1995), together with SMF 
(Johnson et al, 1993).  Cahill & McGaugh’s biochemical theory argues that emotional arousal 
leads to enhanced activation of the amygdala at encoding, and thus better retention of 
information encountered during the arousing situation.  According to SMF view, different 
sources of information have, on average, different phenomenal characteristics associated with 
them.  For the present study the SMF would presume that emotion Ss’ memories of the event 
are more likely to be remembered more vividly, and to include more perceptual detail (e.g., 
the color, shape, and sound associated with it) and contextual detail (e.g., place in the slide 
sequence where it occurred) than the memories of neutral Ss.  In such a situation, one might 
expect that emotion subjects would be less suggestible than neutral subjects because they 
might be able to more easily detect discrepancies between the questionnaire and the event 
(“There was no microscope in that slide.”).  However, the increased vividness of their event 
memory representations might have led to differences in the way the questionnaire items were  
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processed.  Specifically, emotion Ss might have been able to reinstate clearer (or more vivid) 
images of the event while reading the suggestions in the questionnaire, and thus were more 
likely to incorporate suggestions into their memory of the event (similar to how imagery of 
post-event suggestions increases source misattributions, e.g., Zaragoza, et al., 1996).  
According to SMF, at retrieval people judge the activated qualities of a given memory against 
their knowledge of event characteristics.  Thus, one way that source attribution errors can 
occur is when an activated memory trace has characteristics that are typical of an alternate 
source (e.g., when memories of imagined items contain much visual or contextual detail).  
Thus, by virtue of the type of processing deployed during the questionnaire, the characteristics 
of suggested items would have been more “event-like” than memories of neutral condition 
subjects, increasing the misattributions of the items to the slides.  Note, that the findings 
suggest that the impact of emotion arousal was limited to the processing of post-event items 
as emotion subjects were actually significantly less likely to misattribute never-presented 
items. 
The second explanation noted above has difficulty explaining the fact that although 
event memory was enhanced for the 2nd phase only, subjects showed enhanced suggestibility 
for all three phases.  Thus, I propose a third explanation that I term the persistent arousal 
hypothesis.  According to this view, the emotional arousal introduced during the slides during 
phase two persisted into the third phase and subsequently into the processing of the post-event 
questionnaire.  Because of this, emotional event subjects had better item memory for the 
suggested items, but poor source memory.  Keep in mind that the questions refer back to the 
event and contain primarily accurate information about the event.  Thus, even if subjects can 
remember reading the items, this information does not allow them to discriminate items seen  
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in the slides from unseen items.  In this paradigm, subjects can attribute suggested items to 
both the slides and the questions, and indeed this was a common error. 
One major hypothesis of this study was that type of attentional focus (perceptual and 
self-focus) would impact event memory and potentially susceptibility to misinformation.  The 
results are clearly inconsistent with this hypothesis as the type of focus did not improve or 
negatively affect what people remembered for the event or the post-event questionnaire.  
There are several possible explanations.  One possibility is that the focus manipulation at 
encoding was not strong enough.  Recall that subjects rated each slide on the amount of 
perceptual or emotional response in the focus conditions following the slide presentation.  
Given that the ratings took place after subjects had encoded each slide, it is possible subjects 
were not thinking about visual detail or their own emotions until they were prompted to make 
their ratings.  In other words, participants in the various focus conditions may have encoded 
the slides similarly.  A second possible explanation is that because subjects knew that there 
was going to be a memory test at the end of the experiment, they devoted their full attention to 
encoding event details and thus subjects in the various conditions encoded information in 
similar ways.  Finally, it could be that memory for the event (whether emotional or not) is 
simply very good with an immediate test and the impact of attentional focus manipulation is 
too small to be detected.  This would suggest that perhaps the effect of attentional focus might 
be more pronounced with a delay. 
Finally, a secondary goal of the present study was to explore the relationship between 
the personality dimension of affect intensity and eyewitness performance.  The analyses 
revealed no relationship between high and low AIM subjects and their performance on the 
source memory test across all item types.  One potential reason why AIM scores did not  
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predict performance in this experiment is that affect intensity primarily affects memories of 
personally relevant (autobiographical) events.  In other words, the emotional story (although 
rated as emotional) did not elicit very high levels of affective response. 
In conclusion, the results of the present study seem to conflict with the commonly held 
beliefs about the impact of emotion; that memories of highly emotional events are highly 
accurate and resistant to misinformation.  Although, witnessing a slide sequence of an 
emotional event is clearly different from witnessing an actual emotional event, nonetheless 
the present research presents some empirical support that memory can be enhanced and 
impaired by emotion.  In particular, the results of this study indicate that emotional arousal 
can increase the impact of post-event information.  Therefore, one implication is that real-life 
eyewitnesses who experience highly emotionally arousing events may be even more 
susceptible to misleading post-event information provided by other witnesses, through 
questioning procedures, or by media accounts of the event. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE SHORT AFFECT INTENSITY SCALE 
Directions:  The following questions refer to emotional reactions to typical life-events.  Please 
indicate how YOU react to these events by placing a number from the following scale in the 
blank space preceding each item.  Please base your answers on how YOU react, not on how 
you think others react or how you think a person should react. 
1 = I never feel like that 
2 = I almost never feel like that 
3 = I occasionally feel like that 
4 = I usually feel like that 
5 = I almost always feel like that 
6 = I always feel like that 
FACTOR 1: positive emotions 
_____When I feel happy, it is a strong type of exuberance. 
_____My happy moods are so strong that I feel like I’m in heaven. 
_____If I complete a task I thought was impossible, I am ecstatic. 
_____When I’m feeling well, it’s easy for me to go from being in a good mood to being really 
joyful. 
_____When I’m happy I feel like I’m bursting with joy. 
_____When I’m happy I feel very energetic. 
_____When things are going good I feel “on top of the world.” 
_____When I’m happy I bubble over with energy. 
 
 43
FACTOR 2: negative emotions 
_____Sad movie deeply touch me. 
_____When I talk in front of a group for the first time, my voice gets shaky and my heart 
races. 
_____When I do something wrong, I have strong feelings of shame and guilt. 
_____When I do feel anxiety, it is normally very strong. 
_____When I feel guilty, this emotion is quite strong. 
_____When I am nervous, I get shaky all over. 
FACTOR 3: reversed positive emotions 
_____When I’m happy, it’s a feeling of being untroubled and content rather than being zestful 
and aroused (reversed). 
_____When I succeed at something, my reaction is calm contentment (reversed). 
_____When I know I have done something very well, I feel relaxed and content rather than 
excited and elated (reversed). 
_____When I feel happiness, it is a quiet type of contentment (reversed). 
_____I would characterize my happy moods as closer to contentment than to joy (reversed). 
_____When I am happy the feeling is more like contentment and inner calm than one of 
exhilaration and excitement (reversed). 
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APPENDIX B 
SLIDE PRESENTATION SENTENCES 
(Cahill & McGaugh, 1995) 
Slide Neutral version Arousal version 
1 A mother and her son are leaving home in 
the morning. 
A mother and her son are leaving home in the 
morning. 
2 She is taking him to visit his father’s work 
place. 
She is taking him to visit his father’s work 
place. 
3 The father is a laboratory technician at 
Victory Memorial Hospital. 
The father is a laboratory technician at 
Victory Memorial Hospital. 
4 They check before crossing a busy road. They check before crossing a busy road. 
5 While walking along, the boy sees some 
wrecked cars in a junkyard, which he finds 
interesting. 
While crossing a busy road the boy is caught 
in a terrible accident, which critically injures 
him. 
6 At the hospital, the staff are preparing for a 
disaster practice drill, which the boy will 
watch. 
At the hospital, the staff prepares the 
emergency room, to which the boy is rushed. 
7 All morning long, a surgical team practiced 
the disaster drill procedures. 
All morning long, a surgical team struggled to 
save the boy’s life. 
8 Make-up artists were able to create realistic-
looking injuries on actors for the drill. 
Specialized surgeons were able to re-attach 
the boy’s severed feet. 
9 After the drill, while the father watched the 
boy, the mother left to phone her other 
child’s pre-school. 
After the surgery, while the father stayed with 
the boy, the mother left to phone her other 
child’s pre-school. 
10 Running a little late, she phones the 
preschool to tell them she will soon pick up 
her child. 
Feeling distraught, she phones the pre-school 
to tell them she will soon pick up her child. 
11 Heading to pick her child, she hails a taxi at 
the number nine bus stops 
Heading to pick her child, she hails a taxi at 
the number nine bus stops. 
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